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ABSTRACT
While Bayesian model selection is a useful tool to discriminate between com-
peting cosmological models, it only gives a relative rather than an absolute
measure of how good a model is. Bayesian doubt introduces an unknown bench-
mark model against which the known models are compared, thereby obtaining
an absolute measure of model performance in a Bayesian framework.
We apply this new methodology to the problem of the dark energy equation
of state, comparing an absolute upper bound on the Bayesian evidence for a
presently unknown dark energy model against a collection of known models
including a flat ΛCDM scenario. We find a strong absolute upper bound to
the Bayes factor B between the unknown model and ΛCDM, giving B
∼
< 3.
The posterior probability for doubt is found to be less than 6% (with a 1%
prior doubt) while the probability for ΛCDM rises from an initial 25% to just
over 50% in light of the data. We conclude that ΛCDM remains a sufficient
phenomenological description of currently available observations and that there
is little statistical room for model improvement.
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most important questions in cosmology is
to identify the fundamental model underpinning the
vast amount of observations nowadays available. The so-
called “cosmological concordance model” is based on the
cosmological principle (i.e., that the Universe is isotropic
and homogeneous, at least on large enough scales) and
on the hot Big Bang scenario, complemented by an in-
flationary epoch. This remarkably simple model is able
to explain with only half a dozen free parameters obser-
vations spanning a huge range of time and length scales.
Since both a cold dark matter (CDM) and a cosmological
constant (Λ) component are required to fit the data, the
concordance model is often referred to as “the ΛCDM
model”. It is however important to keep in mind that at
this stage the ΛCDM model is not a model in the sense
attributed to the word by particle physicists, but rather
a phenomenological scenario that appears to be able to
explain the vast majority of observations with a great
economy of free parameters.
In the classical approach to statistics, models (or hy-
potheses) can never be proved true, only falsified. Popper
(1959), for example, argued that theories always remain
“infinitely improbable” regardless of the amount of evi-
dence gathered in their favour. However, in the context of
Bayesian inference support can be accrued for a model if
the observed data verify predictions made by the model
but not by competing models (see Jaynes (2003)). This is
the subject of Bayesian model selection (see e.g. Trotta
(2008); Trotta (2007) for applications to the cosmological
context): given a set of competing models, the Bayes fac-
tor gives a measure of the relative performance of each
model in explaining the data. This program naturally
prefers models that provide a good fit with the fewest
number of free parameters, thus implementing a quanti-
tative version of Occam’s razor.
Although Bayesian model selection can identify the
best model in a given set of known models, it has no
way of indicating whether the absolute quality of the
preferred model is high or low. However, it seems desir-
able to be able to gauge the absolute performance of a
model in a Bayesian sense, rather than just its relative
performance with respect to known competitors. In par-
ticular, this seems crucial for deciding whether the set
of known models includes the true model.
The purpose of this paper is to build on the notion
of Bayesian doubt introduced by Starkman et al. (2008)
to develop and apply a Bayesian technique for model
discovery, focusing in particular on the nature of dark
energy. The structure of this paper is as follows: in sec-
tion 2 we recall the notion of Bayesian doubt and intro-
duce a new procedure for estimating an upper bound for
the Bayes factor in favour of doubt. We next employ this
procedure in section 3 to assess the state of our knowl-
edge of the dark energy equation of state, focusing on
the status of the current ΛCDM concordance model. We
present our results in terms of the posterior probability
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for doubt and for ΛCDM in section 4 and discuss our
conclusions in section 5.
2 BAYESIAN MODEL DISCOVERY
In this section we review the concept of Bayesian doubt
and explain how this can lead to model discovery.
2.1 The notion of Bayesian doubt
Bayesian doubt, as introduced by Starkman et al.
(2008), is an extension of Bayesian model selection. It
seeks to determine a scale quantifying the absolute qual-
ity of a model, as opposed to the relative performance of
two models, given by their Bayes factor. The key idea of
Bayesian doubt is that the general statistical character-
istics of what would be recognised as a ‘good’ model are
known, even if the specifics of the model are not.
We begin by introducing a hypothetical unknown
model X which has the characteristics of what would be
considered a good model, to be defined below. This ideal-
ized good model then acts as a benchmark against which
known models can be compared using standard Bayesian
model selection. Following Starkman et al. (2008), we
define ‘doubt’, D, as the posterior probability of this un-
known model:
D ≡ p(X|d) =
p(d|X)p(X)
p(d)
=
(
1 +
∑
i p(d|Mi)p(Mi)
p(d|X)p(X)
)−1 (1)
where {Mi} (i = 1, . . . , N) is the set of N known models
and d are the data. In the above expression, p(X) is the
prior probability for the model X, in other words, the
prior probability that our list of known models does not
contain the true model. p(Mi) is the prior probability
of model Mi and p(d|Mi) is the Bayesian evidence for
model Mi, given by
p(d|Mi) =
∫
dθip(d|θi,Mi)p(θi|Mi), (2)
where θi are the parameters of model Mi. p(d|θi,Mi)
is the likelihood function for modelMi, and p(θi|Mi) is
the prior probability of the parameters of model Mi.
Once we have chosen the level of prior doubt by
defining the value of p(X), based on a principle of indif-
ference we assume for simplicity that the prior probabil-
ities for the known N models are all equal, i.e.
p(Mi) =
1
N
(1− p(X)) . (3)
We single out the ΛCDM model as one of the set of
known models, and, looking ahead, refer to it as our
baseline model. Therefore it is useful to rewrite Eq. (1)
as
D =
(
1 +
〈BiΛ〉
BXΛ
(
1− p(X)
p(X)
))−1
, (4)
where we have introduced the Bayes factor
Bij ≡
p(d|Mi)
p(d|Mj)
(5)
and the average Bayes factor between ΛCDM and each
of the known models:
〈BiΛ〉 ≡
1
N
N∑
j=1
BjΛ. (6)
(Note that the sum over modelsMj includes j = Λ and
therefore 〈BiΛ〉 > 1/N .)
Rather than looking at D directly, one can also con-
sider the relative change in doubt R, given by the ratio
of posterior to prior doubt:
R ≡
D
p(X)
=
(
p(X) + (1− p(X))
〈BiΛ〉
BXΛ
)−1
. (7)
A necessary condition for doubt to grow (R > 1) is
〈BiΛ〉
BXΛ
≪ 1, (8)
i.e., that the Bayes factor between model X and
ΛCDM be much larger than the average Bayes factor
between the known models and ΛCDM.
However, for ΛCDM to be genuinely doubted it is
not sufficient thatR > 1. One has also to require that the
probability for ΛCDM itself decreases, i.e., that p(Λ|d) <
p(Λ). Applying again Bayes theorem, one finds that the
ratio of the posterior probability for ΛCDM to its prior
probability is given by
RΛ ≡
p(Λ|d)
p(Λ)
= ((1− p(X))〈BiΛ〉+ p(X)BXΛ)
−1 . (9)
Hence to gather genuine doubt against ΛCDM we require
that both conditions R > 1 and RΛ < 1 be fulfilled.
2.2 Upper bound on the evidence of the
unknown model
In order to apply Bayesian doubt to the problem of cos-
mological model selection, it is necessary to estimate the
evidence of the unknown model, p(d|X). The approach
suggested by Starkman et al. (2008) was to calibrate the
value of p(d|X) on simulated data sets from the best
among the known models. This has been shown to lead
to model discovery for a toy linear model. However, in
the cosmological context it would be very computation-
ally expensive to implement, even given fast algorithms
to compute the evidence, such as MultiNest (Feroz et al.
2009) or the Savage-Dickey density ratio (Trotta 2007).
In this paper, we put forward a different, more eco-
nomical approach, which aims at computing an abso-
lute upper bound for p(d|X). Since our aim is to investi-
gate the dark energy sector, in the following we focus on
the dark energy equation of state, w(z). We cannot, of
course, compute the evidence for X explicitly since its
parameterization of w(z) is unspecified. Since the un-
known model X is to provide a benchmark value for the
evidence of the known models, it should be designed to
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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provide a good fit to the available data, including cos-
mic microwave background (CMB), matter power spec-
trum (mpk) and supernovae type Ia (SNIa) observations.
Therefore, the unknown model should have a high degree
of flexibility. At the same time, we do not wish to incur
the Occam’s razor penalty coming from the high number
of free parameters usually associated with a very flexible
model. This is because we are seeking to build a phe-
nomenological description for w(z) which, if model X is
to be a ‘good’ model, should arise from an underlying,
presently unknown theory with a small number of free
parameters.
In order to have the advantages of a flexible (and
therefore well-fitting) unknown model (i.e. low χ2/dof),
without incurring a penalty for having a large number of
free parameters, we define the evidence of the unknown
model via the upper bound on the Bayes factor between
the ΛCDM baseline model and a stand-in model with a
very flexible w(z) (as specified in section 3.2 below). The
absolute upper bound on the Bayes factor BXΛ between
the unknown model X and ΛCDM (denoted by a sub-
script Λ) is given by (see Gordon & Trotta (2007) and
references therein for details),
BXΛ < BXΛ = exp
(
−
1
2
(χ2X − χ
2
Λ)
)
. (10)
We have defined the best-fit chi-squared as minus 2 the
log-likelihood at the best-fit point, θ∗i :
χ2i = −2 ln p(d|θi,Mi)
∣∣∣
θi=θ
∗
i
, (11)
where i = X,Λ.
The bound of Eq. (10) arises by putting a posteriori
the prior probability for the parameters of the stand-
in model into a delta-function located at the observed
maximum likelihood value, i.e. by replacing p(θX |MX)
in Eq. (2) with δ(θX − θ
∗
X). While this prior choice has
no Bayesian justification (for it is inappropriate to use a
posteriori information to determine the prior), it does
lead to an absolute upper bound on the relative evi-
dence between the baseline ΛCDM model and the un-
known model. In order to calculate the absolute bound of
Eq. (10), all that is needed is the difference between the
best fit log-likelihood (or chi-squared) of the two models,
∆χ2 ≡ χ2X − χ
2
Λ, which can be easily computed. Since
the ΛCDM model is nested within the unknown model
(i.e., the unknown model reverts to ΛCDM for a specific
choice of its parameters leading to w(z) = −1), it follows
that ∆χ2 6 0. Therefore it is clear that by construction
BXΛ > 1 always, i.e., that our unknown model is always
at least as good as ΛCDM.
By inspecting Eq. (10), one might be tempted to
think that this upper bound on the Bayes factor merely
translates in Bayesian terms the old goodness-of-fit χ2
test. For if ΛCDM is a “bad” model (on whatever scale
one wishes to define this), the value of χ2Λ will be large
and thus the Bayes factor in favour of the unknown
model will be large, as well. Thus one might think that
Eq. (10) simply rephrases the well-known rule-of-thumb
of χ2/dof ∼ 1. However, this is not the case, for the
| lnBij | Odds Strength of evidence
< 1.0
∼
< 3 : 1 Inconclusive
1.0 ∼ 3 : 1 Weak evidence
2.5 ∼ 12 : 1 Moderate evidence
5.0 ∼ 150 : 1 Strong evidence
Table 1. Empirical scale for evaluating the strength of ev-
idence from the Bayes factor Bij between two models (so–
called ‘Jeffreys’ scale’). The right–most column gives our con-
vention for denoting the different levels of evidence above
these thresholds, following Gordon & Trotta (2007).
χ2/dof ∼ 1 rule only applies asymptotically (for n→∞
number of data points) and only if the data points are
independent, Gaussian distributed. Those conditions are
almost invariably not met in the cosmological context.
For instance, it is not even clear how one would define the
concept of degrees of freedom for the CMB data, given
that the Cℓ’s are not independent and are not Gaus-
sian distributed. In the case of SNIa observations, the
χ2/dof ∼ 1 criterion is satisfied for ΛCDM by construc-
tion, for the value of the intrinsic dispersion for the SNe
is adjusted in such a way to require this to be the case, see
e.g. Kowalski et al. (2008). Therefore one cannot mean-
ingfully use this kind of absolute goodness-of-fit tests on
such a data set.
Instead, the upper bound given by Eq. (10) does not
require any assumption about asymptotic behaviour, nor
that the data are Gaussian distributed, nor independent.
One only needs to be able to compute the log-likelihood
at the best-fit point, including relevant correlations as
necessary.
Finally, the upper bound of Eq. (10) could also be
computed using the highest best-fit log-likelihood of all
the known models, at no extra computational cost. This
would give the absolute upper bound achievable among
the class of known models. Although we do not pursue
this approach in this paper, we recommend including in
any Bayesian model comparison a model X with evi-
dence obtained via this procedure, for this will give an
estimate of the maximum possible level of doubt that can
arise from the known models with their assigned priors.
2.3 Behaviour of doubt and posterior
probability for ΛCDM
In the following, we will adopt the absolute upper bound
BXΛ of Eq. (10) as an estimator for the Bayes factor of
the unknown model X, and explore the consequence in
terms of doubt and in terms of the posterior probability
for ΛCDM. It is clear from Eqs. (4) and (9) that for a
given level of prior doubt p(X), the posterior models’
probabilities are controlled uniquely by the two quanti-
ties 〈BiΛ〉 and BXΛ. The result can be expected to fall
within one of the three scenarios below, which we will ex-
amine from two points of view: using doubt D and using
the upper bound to the Bayes factor BXΛ as measures of
doubt. While there is something to be said for employing
BXΛ (whose value can be translated into a strength of
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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evidence via the Jeffreys’ scale, given in Table 1) as a
criterion for goodness of fit, it turns out that doubt can
shed some light onto how large BXΛ should be to have
genuine doubt without referring to the (in some sense
arbitrary calibrated) Jeffreys’ scale.
• Case 1: BXΛ ≫ 1 and 〈BiΛ〉 ∼ 1: in this case,
the unknown model has a much better evidence than
ΛCDM, which in turn has about the same evidence as
the other known models. As the Bayes factor BXΛ > 1,
we should expect there to be a significant amount of
doubt, D ≈ 1. And indeed, from Eq. (1) the doubt is,
assuming p(X)≪ 1:
D ≈
(
1 +
1
p(X)BXΛ
)−1
≈ 1, (12)
for p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1. In other words, we are inclined to
believe that there is a better model that we have not
yet thought of if the Bayes factor between the unknown
model and ΛCDM is sufficiently large to override the
smallness of the prior doubt, BXΛ > 1/p(X) (notice the
independence of the Jeffreys’ scale). The change in the
probability for ΛCDM itself is given by, from Eq. (9),
RΛ ≈
(
1 + p(X)BXΛ
)−1
. (13)
While the doubt grows (D → 1) the probability for
ΛCDM declines, RΛ ≪ 1. In this case, one is led to
genuinely doubt ΛCDM.
• Case 2: BXΛ ≫ 1 and BiΛ ≪ 1(i 6= Λ): in this case,
ΛCDM is clearly the best of the known models, as the
Bayes factors between the known models and ΛCDM are
all small. Again, as the Bayes factor BXΛ ≫ 1 favors
the unknown model, we should be doubting our list of
models. As 〈BiΛ〉 ≈ 1/N , we find
D ≈
(
1 +
1
Np(X)BXΛ
)−1
≈ 1. (14)
for p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1/N . This seems to contradict the re-
sult of Case 1. However, as we noted above, the condi-
tion that D ≈ 1 is only necessary but not sufficient for
doubt to arise. We need to examine the relative change
in probability for ΛCDM which is given by
RΛ ≈
(
1
N
+ p(X)BXΛ
)−1
. (15)
Requiring RΛ < 1 leads to the stronger condition
p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1, as in Case 1 above. If the latter con-
dition is not fulfilled, doubt will grow at the expenses of
the probability of the other known models, as the prior
probability mass which was spread among the N known
models according to Eq. (3) gets redistributed between
X and ΛCDM.
• Case 3: BXΛ ∼ 1: in this case, the upper bound
on the Bayes factor between the unknown model and
ΛCDM is of order unity. This means that we should have
no reason to doubt our set of models. The expression for
doubt Eq. (1) simplifies to
D ≈
(
1 +
〈BiΛ〉
p(X)
)−1
. (16)
In order to reach a high level of doubt D ≈ 1, we would
need 〈BiΛ〉/p(X) ≈ 0. Clearly, this is only the case if we
allow for p(X) ≫ 〈BiΛ〉 6 1/N , i.e. if we are starting
off with a prior doubt which is larger than the indiffer-
ence prior on the known models, which is usually not the
case. Otherwise, if the Bayes factor BXΛ is larger than
the prior doubt p(X), we can regard our list of mod-
els as reasonably complete, and perform Bayesian model
comparison among the list of known models. Of course,
this procedure must be repeated once new data arrives
(see Starkman et al. (2009) for the procedure that this
entails). Note that again we do not need to refer to the
Jeffreys’ scale, but need to compare the average Bayes
factor 〈BiΛ〉 with our prior doubt p(X).
In summary, we are led to doubt the current baseline
ΛCDM model only if the rule of thumb
p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1 (17)
is satisfied, which corresponds to either Case 1 above
or to Case 2 when the condition for RΛ < 1 is also
fulfilled. If Eq. (17) is satisfied, we are guaranteed that
doubt will grow and at the same time the probability
for the ΛCDM model will decrease, thus signaling the
opportunity for model discovery. All this is accomplished
without referring to Jeffreys’ scale.
3 APPLICATION OF DOUBT TO THE
DARK ENERGY EQUATION OF STATE
3.1 The known models
We take the flat ΛCDM model as our baseline
model, described by the usual 6-parameters set θ =
{As, nS , ωb, ωc,ΩΛ,H0}, where As is the amplitude of
scalar fluctuations, nS is the spectral index, ωb the phys-
ical baryon density, ωc the cold dark matter density, ΩΛ
the density parameter for the cosmological constant and
H0 the Hubble constant today. We assume purely adia-
batic fluctuations throughout this paper.
We define the other models in the known models
list by increasing the complexity of the baseline model
in successive steps. First, we only add a non-zero curva-
ture parameter, Ωκ 6= 0, with a flat prior in the range
−0.3 6 Ωκ 6 0.3, akin to the “Astronomer’s prior”
adopted and justified in Vardanyan et al. (2009). Alter-
natively, another model is obtained by only adding an
effective equation of state parameter for dark energy,
w 6= −1, with a flat prior in the range −1.3 6 w 6 −0.7
while keeping Ωκ = 0 fixed. Finally, a fourth model with
8 free parameters is obtained by adding both Ωκ 6= 0
and w 6= −1 with the above priors to the ΛCDM base-
line model.
One could in principle further increase the complex-
ity of the known models, e.g. by adopting more com-
plex descriptions for w(z), such as the so–called CPL
parameterization in terms of the parameters (w0, wa).
However, those models have in general a lower evidence
than ΛCDM, as they are penalized for their wasted pa-
rameter space, see e.g. Liddle et al. (2006b). As a conse-
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quence, they are expected not to contribute significantly
to 〈BiΛ〉, and therefore their influence on posterior doubt
would be minor, see section 4.2 for details. One could
also add to the list alternative explanations for the ap-
parent acceleration of the Universe, such as for exam-
ple modified gravity models, provided one can compute
their evidence numerically (Heavens et al. 2007). As the
main goal of this paper is to introduce the methodology
related to Bayesian doubt, we however restrict our con-
siderations to the four models listed above. We comment
in section 4.2 on how our results would change if the list
of known models would be further enlarged.
Finally, in this work we do not address the problem
of the fine tuning of the value of the cosmological con-
stant itself. All models we consider here suffer equally
from the fine tuning problem, i.e., the fact that the mea-
sured value of the cosmological constant is some 120 or-
ders of magnitude smaller than the “natural” scale set by
the Planck mass if Λ arises from quantum fluctuations
of the vacuum. Anthropic reasoning in the context of the
Multiverse has been invoked to explain the smallness of
the cosmological constant, and while Bayesian reasoning
could be brought to bear on the effectiveness of such an
“explanation”, we shall not consider this aspect further
in the present paper.
3.2 Parameterization of the unknown model
Our discussion so far has been completely general,
sidestepping the crucial issue of how to evaluate Eq. (10)
for the unknown model. In order to make further
progress, we have to make some assumptions regarding
the class of alternative models the unknown model X is
supposed to come from.
As we are interested in the dark energy sector, we
will assume that the phenomenology of model X is such
that it only leads to modifications to the right-hand-
side of Einstein equations. In other words, we do not in-
vestigate models that modify General Relativity except
for those whose only impact is a change in the effec-
tive energy-momentum tensor. Under this assumption,
a model X is fully specified once we give its redshift-
dependent equation of state of dark energy w(z). Notice
that we also implicitly assume that the Universe is well
described by a FRW isotropic cosmology. If one wished to
include a more general class of alternative models from
which to draw X, one could do so by parameterizing
their phenomenology in a suitable way. One could de-
fine even more general classes of alternative models, for
example by fitting parameterized functions to the obser-
vations. However, we do not pursue this approach here,
because such a modeling of the data would be devoid
of any physical insight and would achieve a purely de-
scriptive fit to the observations. To see why this is not
desirable, one only has to push this approach to its ex-
treme consequences: given any data collection, there is
always a “model” that fits the data perfectly. This model
is obtained by simply choosing the value of the “theory”
to be identical to the observed value for each of the ob-
servations. Of course, nobody would ever consider such
a model to be a valid scientific theory, because we de-
mand that the latter should have explanatory power,
not be a simple description of the data. Therefore, it
seems sensible to require from the outset that our un-
known model X be part of a class of physical theories,
with phenomenological parameters that are linked with
the physical framework of the class of models considered
(here, FRW isotropic Universes with time-varying dark
energy equation of state and otherwise standard cosmol-
ogy).
Therefore we are left with the task of parameter-
izing w(z) as a function of redshift, and then use its
functional form to compute the ∆χ2 between the un-
known model and the ΛCDM baseline model. To this
purpose, we employ the Parameterized Post Friedman
(PPF) prescription developed by Hu & Sawicki (2007);
Hu (2008). The PPF prescription was originally intro-
duced to describe the behavior of theories of modified
gravity in a metric framework that describes leading or-
der deviations from general relativity (subject to certain
assumptions). However, it was also found be well-suited
for describing the evolution of dark energy models that
cross the so–called “phantom divide”, w = −1. Crossing
this phantom divide in models with fixed sound speed
would lead to divergences in the pressure perturbations.
Hence models that are phenomenologically described by
a time-varying w(z) that crosses w = −1 must be de-
scribed micro-physically by a theory of scalar-fields with
a varying speed of sound, e.g. DGP-type models.
3.3 Numerical implementation and data sets
Below, we investigate the behaviour of doubt for differ-
ent combinations of cosmological data sets. In particular,
we are interested in studying doubt as the constraining
power of the combined data increases.
We modified the CosmoMC (Lewis & Bridle 2002))
parameter estimation package to sample the addi-
tional parameters wi ≡ w(zi), where zi are uniformly
spaced at n = 10 redshift value, ranging from z =
0 . . . 1.5. Fang et al. (2008a,b) wrote a plugin to CAMB
(Lewis et al. 2000) that implements the PPF prescrip-
tion and is freely available for download1, which we
adopted for this work. The PPF module uses cubic
splines to interpolate w between these points, and as-
sumes w(z > 1.5) ≡ w(z = 1.5).
We adopted the 307 SNe Ia from the “Union”
data set compiled by Kowalski et al. (2008). The CMB
data and likelihood used was the WMAP five year
data set (Dunkley et al. 2009). Tegmark et al. (2006)
provided the data and likelihood code for the matter
power spectrum using SDSS DR4. The evidence for the
known models is computed using the publicly available
MultiNest code (Feroz & Hobson 2008; Feroz et al. 2009;
1 http://camb.info/ppf/
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Trotta et al. 2008), which implements the nested sam-
pling algorithm, employed as an add-in sampler to Cos-
moMC (Lewis & Bridle 2002) and CAMB (Lewis et al.
2000).
The gist of nested sampling is that the multi–
dimensional evidence integral of Eq. (2) is recast into a
one–dimensional integral. This is accomplished by defin-
ing the prior volume x as dx ≡ p(θ)dθ so that
x(λ) =
∫
L(θ)>λ
p(θ)dθ (18)
where the integral is over the parameter space enclosed
by the iso-likelihood contour L(θ) = λ. So x(λ) gives the
volume of parameter space above a certain level λ of the
likelihood. Then the Bayesian evidence, Eq. (2), can be
written as
p(d) =
∫ 1
0
L(x)dx, (19)
where L(x) is the inverse of Eq. (18). Samples from L(X)
can be obtained by drawing uniformly samples from the
likelihood volume within the iso–contour surface defined
by λ. The 1–dimensional integral of Eq. (19) can be ob-
tained by simple quadrature, thus
p(d) ≈
∑
i
L(xi)Wi, (20)
where the weights are Wi =
1
2
(xi−1 − xi+1). The stan-
dard deviation on the value of the log-evidence can be es-
timated as (H/nlive)
1/2, where H is the negative relative
entropy and nlive is the number of live points adopted,
which in our case is nlive = 4000 (see Feroz & Hobson
(2008) for details).
The best-fit χ2 required to evaluate Eq. (10) is
obtained by performing a Metropolis–Hastings Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) reconstruction of the
posterior of the 16 parameters model comprising the
ΛCDM parameters θ and the above 10-parameters de-
scription of w(z). We gather a total of 5 × 105 samples
in 8 parallel chains and verify that the Gelman & Ru-
bin mixing criterion (Gelman & Rubin 1992) is satisfied
(i.e., R ≪ 0.1, where R is the inter-chain variance di-
vided by the intra-chain variance).
MCMC is rather geared towards exploring the bulk
of the posterior probability density, and is not partic-
ularly optimised to look for the absolute best-fit value.
This is especially true for high dimensional parameter
spaces. Therefore, we expect that the best-fit χ2 values
recovered via MCMC for the 16-dimensional model X
are going to be systematically higher than the true best-
fit. In order to estimate and correct for this numerical
bias, we sampled via MCMC a 16 dimensional Gaussian
of unit variance, recovered the best-fit χ2 and compared
it with the true best-fit value, repeating the procedure
5000 times. This gives an estimate of the numerical bias,
under the assumption (which is valid locally) that the
posterior distribution of model X is close to Gaussian
in the immediate vicinity of the best-fit. We found that
the MCMC systematically overestimates the best-fit χ2
value by 0.94 ± 0.14, and therefore subtracted this esti-
mate from the recovered χ2 best-fit value for model X.
We also verified that the numerical bias in recovering the
best-fit χ2 for a 6-dimensional parameter space (such as
ΛCDM) is negligible in comparison.
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We now proceed to evaluate the doubt and the poste-
rior probability of ΛCDM for various combinations of
cosmological data sets.
4.1 Model comparison outcome including
doubt
In Table 2, we present the estimated upper limit on the
Bayes factor between ΛCDM and model X as well as
the Bayes factors with respect to ΛCDM for the other
known models. Among the known models, we confirm
what many others have shown – that ΛCDM is the
best-fit known model, or at least that no other model
is demonstrably better. Thus, we find an inconclusive
model comparison result (according to the Jeffreys’ scale,
Table 1) when comparing ΛCDM and a model with a
free (but constant) w. We also find weak to moderate
evidence (1 ∼
< lnB ∼
< 2.5) against spatially curved mod-
els when compared to a flat ΛCDM, in agreement with
the more detailed findings of Vardanyan et al. (2009).
Finally, there is weak to moderate evidence against the
most complex of the known models – one exhibiting
both w 6= −1 and Ωκ 6= 0. This is in good agreement
with the results of previous more thorough analyses,
e.g. Liddle et al. (2006a,b) and Li et al. (2009). From
this, ordinary Bayesian model comparison concludes that
ΛCDM is still the best of the known models (at least for
the limited range of alternative models considered here).
Most importantly, in the table, we report the im-
provement in the best-fit log-likelihood obtained over
ΛCDM by using X, and use this to compute an ab-
solute upper bound to the Bayes factor via Eq. (10).
We notice that the improvement in the best-fit is fairly
modest for all the data sets considered, supportive of
the general sentiment in the community that ΛCDM is
in good agreement with available observations and that
therefore there is little room for statistical improvement
of the quality of fit. This is in part because it is very
hard to improve the quality of fit by changing w(z) –
observables are usually a double integral of w(z), and
therefore insensitive to features in the equation of state
(see e.g Huterer & Turner (1999); Maor et al. (2001) and
Clarkson (2009)). As a consequence, even a highly flexi-
ble w(z) model such as the one we used here to describe
X will lead to only small observable departures from the
standard cosmological constant scenario. It is important
to keep in mind that such statements depend strongly
on the statistics one employs to examine the models.
For example, the standard likelihood function for CMB
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−1.3 < w < −0.7 w = −1.0 −1.3 < w < −0.7 “Unknown” model X 〈BiΛ〉 BXΛ
Ωκ = 0.0 −0.3 < Ωκ < 0.3 −0.3 < Ωκ < 0.3
lnBjΛ lnBjΛ lnBjΛ ∆χ
2 lnBXΛ
CMB only 0.18± 0.09 −1.03± 0.09 −1.09± 0.09 −1.21± 0.3 0.61 ± 0.2 0.72± 0.03 1.83± 0.3
CMB + SN −0.37± 0.09 −1.30± 0.09 −1.63± 0.09 −2.34± 0.3 1.17 ± 0.2 0.54± 0.02 3.22± 0.5
CMB + mpk −0.50± 0.08 −2.57± 0.08 −2.69± 0.08 −0.88± 0.3 0.44 ± 0.2 0.44± 0.01 1.55± 0.2
CMB + SN + mpk −0.48± 0.09 −2.51± 0.09 −2.73± 0.09 −2.15± 0.3 1.08 ± 0.2 0.44± 0.01 2.93± 0.6
Table 2. In the first three columns, we report the Bayes factors between the known models and ΛCDM for different combinations
of data sets, where lnBjΛ < 0 favours ΛCDM. The fourth columns gives ∆χ
2 = χ2X − χ
2
Λ, the improvement in the best-fit log-
likelihood obtained by using model X (specified in the text) over ΛCDM. The last column gives the corresponding absolute upper
bound to the Bayes factor between model X and ΛCDM.
data is insensitive to most of the reported anomalies in
the low-ℓ CMB Copi et al. (2010); Bennett et al. (2010).
The interesting consequence from the point of view
of doubt is that this translates into strong upper limits
for the Bayes factor between model X and ΛCDM (third
from last column of Table 2). We find that the upper
limit on the Bayes factor BXΛ (last column of Table 2)
for all the data combinations is less than 3, just around
“weak evidence” threshold (lnB = 1, see Table 1). From
our discussion in section 2.2, this means that the nec-
essary condition for doubt to grow, p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1, is
not met for any reasonable doubt prior choice. We re-
mind the reader at this point that our unknown model
X has been designed in such a way as to exhibit the
maximum possible evidence against ΛCDM. Therefore,
if even such a model cannot achieve a significant level
of evidence against ΛCDM, one can safely conclude that
no other reasonable model will. Of course this conclusion
depends both on the set of observations we have consid-
ered and on the particular likelihood function we have
ascribed to that data. New statistical treatments can
bring to light anomalies in the existing data, while new
observations might contain new unexpected features.
Our results in terms of posterior probability for
doubt and for the ΛCDM model are shown in Table 3,
for two different assumptions regarding the level of prior
doubt, p(X) = 10−2 and p(X) = 10−6. These two
choices are representative of a range that we think might
bracket reasonable prior expectations: a prior doubt of
1% is certainly not too large, while leaving a little space
for updating our models beliefs in the light of data. A
prior doubt of 10−6 reflects the fact that surely we have
to allow for a one-in-a-million chance that our current
list of known models might be incomplete, and that the
true underlying dark energy model might still be undis-
covered.
Table 3 contains the level of doubt, which is up-
dated from the prior by using the results of Table 2 for
the models’ evidences. We find an increase in doubt by a
factor of ∼ 6 for the most constraining data combination
(CMB+SN+mpk). This however is largely a consequence
of the doubt model acquiring some of the probability
mass of the known models other than ΛCDM, as dis-
cussed under Case 3 in section 2.2. Indeed, the posterior
probability of ΛCDM is observed to increase (last col-
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Figure 1. Posterior probability for doubt for the
ΛCDM model as a function of different combinations of data
sets. The probability of ΛCDM increases from the initial 25%
to just about over 50%, while the probability of doubt in-
creases from the initial 1% to just over 6%, mostly as a conse-
quence of acquiring probability from the other 3 known mod-
els considered in the analysis. This signals that ΛCDM re-
mains the most valid statistical description of the data.
umn of Table 3), from the initial prior value p(Λ) ≈ 0.25
to just over 50% for the most constraining data combi-
nation. This result is almost independent of the choice of
prior doubt. The behaviour of the posterior probability
for doubt and ΛCDM for a prior choice p(X) = 10−2 is
shown in Fig. 1, as a function of the data sets employed.
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Doubt D Posterior for ΛCDM, p(Λ|d)
Prior doubt: p(X) = 10−2 Prior doubt: p(X) = 10−6 (with p(X) = 10−2 and p(Λ) ≈ 0.25)
CMB only (2.50 ± 0.2) × 10−2 (2.54± 0.2)× 10−6 0.34± 0.01
CMB+SN (5.69 ± 0.5) × 10−2 (5.97± 0.6)× 10−6 0.44± 0.01
CMB+mpk (3.46 ± 0.3) × 10−2 (3.54± 0.4)× 10−6 0.55± 0.02
CMB+SN+mpk (6.29 ± 0.8) × 10−2 (6.64± 0.9)× 10−6 0.53± 0.02
Table 3. First two columns: Posterior doubt for different data sets combinations and two prior doubt assumptions. Last column:
posterior probability for the ΛCDM model when allowing for the possibility of a 1% prior doubt on the completeness of our list
of known models.
Known models Required ∆χ2 for p(X|d) = p(Λ|d)
N p(X) = 10−2 f p(X) = p(Λ)/f
4 −6.4 4 −5.5
10 −4.6 10 −9.2
20 −3.2 102 −18.4
50 −1.4 103 −27.6
Table 4. Improvement in the χ2 of ΛCDM required for the
unknown model X to have the same a posteriori probability
as ΛCDM. First two columns: as a function of the number of
known models, N , assuming a fixed prior doubt p(X) = 10−2.
Last two columns: assuming a fixed fractional prior doubt,
p(X) = p(Λ)/f , and as a function of f . It is assumed that
the evidence of the known models is much smaller than the
evidence for ΛCDM.
4.2 Impact of the addition of further known
models
We now proceed to estimate the robustness of our find-
ings with respect to expanding the set of known models.
As has been mentioned above, the list of three alterna-
tive known models to ΛCDM we adopted in this work is
far from complete. However, even if a larger number of
models N were included in the known models list, it is
reasonable to assume that the value of the average evi-
dence between the known models and ΛCDMwould scale
approximately as ∝ 1/N , for there is no other known
model that presently can achieve a substantially higher
evidence than ΛCDM (if this was the case, then this
other best model would take the place of ΛCDM and
become our baseline model which we seek to doubt – or
rather the dominant model in our list of models where
we intend to compute the doubt for the whole list). By
equating Eqs. (4) and (9) we can solve for the value of
∆χ2 required for the posterior on doubt to be equal to
the posterior of ΛCDM. This gives the approximate con-
dition (assuming that 〈BiΛ〉 ≈ 1/N and that p(X)≪ 1):
∆χ2 ≈ 2 ln(pN). (21)
So the value of ∆χ2 required for posterior doubt to
reach the posterior for ΛCDM scales logarithmically with
the number of known models. Assuming a prior doubt
p(X) = 10−2 one obtains the values of ∆χ2 listed in
the first column of Table 4 as a function of N . As more
known doubts are put on the table, it becomes easier to
doubt ΛCDM. From this scaling, it would appear that
the improvement of ∆χ2 = −2.3 for modelX reported in
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Figure 2. Posterior for doubt (dashed lines) and for
ΛCDM (solid lines) as a function of −∆χ2 = χ2Λ − χ
2
X as-
suming a fixed prior doubt p(X) = 10−2. Different curves are
for different numbers of known models, N = 1, 4, 10, 20 (from
thin to thick), assuming that 〈BiΛ〉 ≈ 1/N .
Table 2 for the data combination cmb+SN would lead to
a larger probability of doubt than for ΛCDM if we had
assumed a list of N ∼
> 30 known models, rather than
just three. As illustrated in Fig. 2, this effect is however
a consequence of our choice of spreading the level of prior
probabilities among the N known models, while assum-
ing a fixed p(X), see Eq. (3). As N increases, the prior
for ΛCDM decreases while the prior doubt is kept con-
stant. As a consequence, it becomes easier for the former
to “catch up” with the latter.
In order to avoid this spurious effect, one could
choose to set the prior doubt as a fraction 1/f (f > 1)
of the prior probability for ΛCDM, i.e., to require that
the relative probability between X and Λ is constant a
priori, independent of the number of known models. We
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thus replace the prescription of Eq. (3) by
p(Λ) =
1
N
(1− p(X)) (22)
p(X) =
p(Λ)
f
= (Nf + 1)−1 (23)
and by equating the posterior doubt with the posterior
for ΛCDM we obtain the following requirement for the
∆χ2:
∆χ2 = −4 ln f. (24)
This is now independent of the number of known models
N and it only depends logarithmically on the prior doubt
fraction, f . From the last two columns of Table 4 we
can see that even if doubt started off a factor of just
f = 4 less probable than ΛCDM, a ∆χ2 = −5.5 would
be required in order for the unknown modelX to become
as probable as ΛCDM. Increasing the prior gap between
doubt and ΛCDM (i.e., increasing f) only makes the
requirements on the χ2 improvement more taxing.
In summary, once the effect of adding extra models
to the known models’ list is corrected for by introduc-
ing the fractional prior doubt f , we find that the im-
provement in the χ2 found for various combinations of
data sets is insufficient to doubt ΛCDM. If the unknown
model starts off being a factor of 4 less probable than
ΛCDM, one would need an improvement in the χ2 of
about 5 units to reverse the situation in the posterior,
which is quite a bit larger than the maximum χ2 im-
provement observed from the data.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to extend the application of
Bayesian model selection to define an absolute scale of
goodness of fit for models, rather than just a relative
one, such as the Jeffreys’ scale. We showed how the no-
tion of doubt can be used to evaluate the evidence in
favour of a missing ‘ideal’ unknown model in the list
of known cosmological models. We demonstrated how a
useful absolute upper bound to the Bayesian evidence of
an unknown model can be derived and how this can be
implemented in the context of Bayesian model compari-
son.
Doubt can be incorporated in the framework of
model comparison to help us decide whether our cur-
rently “best” model is statistically adequate for the
data at hand. Kunz et al. (2006) introduced the notion
of Bayesian complexity to decide whether the available
models are over-complex with respect to the constrain-
ing power of the data. Bayesian doubt can act as a use-
ful complement to Bayesian complexity, giving an in-
dication of whether the current models are statistically
insufficiently to describe the data. Used in conjunction,
doubt and complexity can thus extend the power and
domain of applicability of Bayesian model comparison.
Of course statistical considerations should never replace
proper physical insight: all of our arguments are re-
stricted to the statistical aspects of data modeling. But
for the problem of dark energy, where most “models” are
of a phenomenological kind, it seems to us that a rigor-
ous statistical framework can help deciding whether new
theoretical explorations might be fruitful. Other domains
where we expect doubt to be useful include the descrip-
tion of the spectral distribution of CMB anisotropies
and the problem of anomalous alignments between mul-
tipoles in the CMB (Tegmark et al. 2003; Schwarz et al.
2004; Land & Magueijo 2005).
We have applied this methodology to the problem
of dark energy, adopting a list of known models includ-
ing possible extensions of the dark energy sector and
non-zero curvature of the Universe. In principle, many
more models could be added to the list of known models.
However we argued that our results are robust against
adding further models to the list of known models. We
found that current CMB, matter power spectrum and
SNIa data do not require the introduction of an alterna-
tive model to the baseline flat ΛCDM model. The upper
bound of the Bayesian evidence for a presently unknown
dark energy model against ΛCDM gives only weak ev-
idence in favour of the unknown model. Since this is
an absolute upper bound, we conclude that ΛCDM re-
mains a sufficient phenomenological description of cur-
rently available observations.
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